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Commodity trading firms occupy a central position in global supply chains and their 
activities have been associated with financial instability, social upheaval and manifold 
forms of ecological devastation. This paper examines these companies in the context of 
debates regarding corporate financialization. We find that since the 2003-2011 
commodity boom, trading firms have become less financialized in terms of the source of 
their profits as they have shifted away from financial activities. However, they have 
become more financialized in terms of the destination of profits, with dividend and share 
repurchase commitments reaching new heights after 2015. In view of this finding, we 
inquire into whether trading firms’ growing commitment to shareholder payouts will 
encourage them to continue to prioritize short-term returns, or whether instead these 
firms’ linkages to financial markets will lend clout to financial activists concerned by the 
long-term environmental and social consequences of their operations. Ultimately, we 
find several sources of commodity trader resilience which insulate them from 
shareholder resolutions and divestment campaigns aimed at curbing ecological 
destruction and human rights abuses in their supply chains. We accordingly suggest that 
pressures from activist investors must be complemented with more wide-ranging efforts 
to defend living systems across the planet. 
 
Keywords: commodity trading firms; ecological crisis; financialization; corporate 
power; shareholder value; financial activism 
 
1. Introduction 
The titles of journalistic books on multinational corporations tend towards hyperbole. Such is 
the case with The Secret Club that Runs the World, American reporter Kate Kelly’s (2014) 
investigation into the world of commodity trading. In reality, the major commodity trading 
firms are not a secret club, but they are shadowy entities that shy away from the spotlight. They 
do not run the world, but they do occupy a central position within contemporary capitalism. 
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The poetic license of Kelly’s title should not detract from the key insight: the commodity 
traders are among the most important firms in the world, and yet most people have never heard 
of them.  
What are commodity trading firms? And why do they matter? At the most fundamental level, 
commodity trading firms are the main intermediaries within global commodity supply chains 
(Chalmin, 1987). Through their extensive transportation activities, they connect the producers 
and the users of raw materials across space. Through their storage facilities, they mediate the 
discontinuities of production and consumption across time. Through their processing 
capabilities, they transform raw materials into secondary products. And through their 
derivatives operations, they manage their exposure to the price fluctuations of the underlying 
commodities that they trade (Pirrong, 2014). In short, the commodity traders control the 
channels through which commodities pass from producers to manufacturers, and they operate 
at the interstices of physical and financial markets.  
A brief glance at market share data reveals the centrality of these multinational giants in the 
supply of essential raw materials. The four largest agricultural commodity traders – Archer 
Daniels Midland (ADM), Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus – control between 75% and 90% 
of the international grain trade; just three commodity traders – Vitol, Glencore and Trafigura – 
handle equivalent to half of OPEC’s total oil output; and Glencore alone accounts for 55% of 
the global zinc market and 36% of the global copper market, while Wilmar accounts for 45% 
of the world trade in palm oil (Lawrence, 2011; Schneyer, 2011; Sheppard & Hume, 2017; 
Stringer, 2014). Over the past decade, the annual revenues of the major commodity trading 
firms have been comparable to, and in some instances even exceeded, those of the Wall Street 
banks as well as the major mining and oil companies (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). 
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Along with staggering financial clout, the commodity traders have also been mired in 
controversy. They have been accused of promoting deforestation and other forms of ecological 
damage (Amazon Watch, 2019; Amnesty International, 2016). There are concerns regarding 
their role in marketing commodities extracted or harvested through forced labour, including 
child labour (Braunschweig et al., 2019). They have been entangled in multiple corruption 
cases (Berne Declaration, 2012). And finally, there are ongoing concerns regarding their 
alleged manipulation of physical markets as well as the potentially destabilizing impacts of 
their speculative activities in derivatives markets (Oxfam, 2012a; The Economist, 2014). The 
fact that commodity traders are embroiled in scandal and controversy is nothing new (see 
Ammann, 2011; Morgan, 1979). But concerns regarding their operations have become more 
widespread against the backdrop of overarching dysfunctions in the global economy over the 
past five decades which have generated increasing inequality, greater financial instability, and 
accelerating ecological breakdown (Dobler & Kesselring, 2019; Elsby, 2020).  
A small but growing body of literature adopts the concept of financialization as a common 
theoretical point of departure to explore the business practices of the commodity trading firms 
(Clapp & Isakson, 2018; Isakson, 2014; Salerno, 2017). According to existing accounts, 
financialization has encouraged a short-term outlook among the commodity traders with the 
result that long-term social stability and ecological integrity, especially in the Global South, 
are heavily discounted in favour of generating immediate financial returns (McMichael, 2012). 
A key theme in this literature is that the concept of financialization helps to reveal how and 
why commodity trading firms have embraced short-term, risky behaviour that boosts their 
profits at the expense of workers, customers, and the communities in which they operate (Clapp 
& Helleiner, 2012a). Notwithstanding all the impressive insights of this body of research, there 
has not yet been a systematic mapping of financialization for all of the major commodity traders. 
Thus, the purpose of this article is to fill these gaps in our knowledge, offering the first 
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comprehensive account of the commodity trading firms in the context of debates regarding 
financialization and corporate involvement in social and ecological harms.  
In our analysis we explore the two main facets of corporate financialization emphasized in the 
literature: the financialization of accumulation and the rise of shareholder value norms (Van 
der Zwan, 2014).  When taken as a whole, we find incongruence between the two facets of 
financialization as they apply to the commodity trading firms. In terms of the first facet of 
financialization (accumulation), the commodity traders have actually become less financialized 
since the end of the 2003-2011 commodity boom as they have shifted their focus away from 
ancillary financial activities towards their core processing and merchandising operations. But 
in terms of the second facet of financialization (shareholder value), the major commodity 
traders have become more financialized with dividend and share repurchase commitments 
reaching higher levels between 2015 and 2019 than in any other period for which we have data. 
These findings, we argue, significantly complicate the commonly-held view among scholars 
that the maximization of shareholder value and the financialization of accumulation run in 
parallel (see also Rabinovich, 2019; Soener, 2020). 
Having mapped the changes undertaken by the major commodity traders, we inquire into 
whether trading firms’ growing commitment to shareholder value will encourage them to 
continue prioritizing short-term returns, or whether instead these firms’ linkages to financial 
markets can be leveraged by financial activists concerned with the long-term environmental 
and social consequences of their activities. This important line of inquiry has been thus far 
neglected. The existing literature has documented how, in the realm of public governance, 
commodity traders have successfully pushed back against regulatory initiatives to curb 
potentially destabilizing derivatives trading in the wake of the global financial crisis and 
commodity price spikes between 2007 and 2011 (Baines, 2017; Helleiner, 2018; Pagliari, 2018). 
Yet much less attention has been given to the role of different forms of financial activism, such 
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as shareholder resolutions and divestment campaigns, in driving improvements in the private 
governance of these firms. Exploring the limits and possibilities of these strategies allows us 
to better grasp the potential paradoxes of financialization. While some facets of financialization 
may fuel the destructive behaviour of commodity trading firms, it may also open up ways for 
shareholders and creditors to pressure companies to reign in that destructive behaviour. 
 
Our findings point to several sources of commodity trader resilience in the face of activist 
investor pressures to reduce their harmful social and ecological impacts. In particular, the 
predominance of private ownership among many of the commodity trading firms shields them 
from equity divestment campaigns or shareholder resolutions. Shareholder voting data indicate 
that shareholder resolutions aimed at environmental and social governance (ESG) 
improvements among the commodity trading firms are few and far between. Furthermore, 
voting patterns of the major asset management firms in resolutions within the commodity sector 
from 2013-2019 indicate that they almost always vote in favour of management resolutions 
seeking approval for dividend payouts and stock buybacks, and they almost invariably vote 
against shareholder resolutions aimed at improving environmental and social governance. Our 
analysis also shows that the threat of debt divestment is attenuated by the dispersion of holdings 
in the commodity traders’ bonds as well as company deleveraging and shadow banking 
activities. Given the weakness of these threats of financial activism, commodity trading firms 
may not feel significant pressure to strengthen their ESG commitments. 
Overall, then, the article makes two key contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, it 
advances a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the variegated financialization of the 
major commodity traders, by showing how these firms have become less financialized in terms 
of their accumulation practices, but more financialized in terms of their shareholder value 
commitments. Secondly, it offers the first assessment of the extent to which, in this context of 
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variegated financialization, financial activism can push the commodity traders to reverse the 
social and ecological harms of their operations. The remainder of the article develops as follows. 
In the second section, we review the existing literature on corporate financialization in the 
commodity sector. In the third section, we set the stage for our empirical mapping of 
financialization metrics by discussing our case selection and presenting data on the ownership 
structures, financing sources and profitability of the major commodity traders. In the fourth 
and fifth sections we empirically map the financialization metrics of commodity trading firms, 
examining the financialization of accumulation and the rise of shareholder value norms, 
respectively. In the sixth section, we assess the extent to which the mobilization of financial 
activist pressures can push these firms to operate in ways concordant with ecological 
restoration and broader societal interests. In the conclusion we summarize our findings and 
argue in favour of multi-faceted efforts to confront the power of diverse and complex entities 
like the commodity trading firms.   
 
2. Financialization and Its Discontents in the Commodity Sector  
The literature on financialization has expanded rapidly in recent decades. Commonly defined 
as the growing role of financial motives, financial markets and financial institutions in the 
global economy (Epstein, 2005, p. 3), the concept’s proliferation largely stems from its 
perceived potential in capturing key shifts in global capitalism since the 1970s (Davis & Kim, 
2015). With regard to corporate financialization in the commodity sector, two key approaches 
can be discerned, which broadly mirror two of the main approaches identified in the literature 
on corporate financialization at large (Van der Zwan, 2014). The first approach in this broader 
literature conceptualizes financialization as the growth in accumulation via financial activities 
at both the firm-level and in the broader economy (Stockhammer, 2004; Krippner, 2011). The 
7 
second approach takes financialization to be driven by the ascendancy of shareholder value 
norms, which has led to corporate downsizing and outsourcing, on the one hand, and increased 
payments by firms to shareholders via dividends and share repurchases, on the other (Lazonick 
& O’Sullivan, 2000; Milberg 2008).  
 
The financialization of accumulation  
Researchers who adopt the first approach to financialization broadly see it as a distinct phase 
in the history of capitalist accumulation. When it comes to understanding the relations between 
financialization, ecological degradation and the transformation of commodity markets, Jason 
Moore’s (2015) world-ecology framework has arguably been the most influential. Drawing on 
the work of Giovanni Arrighi (1994), Moore views capitalist history as an unfolding of 
alternate waves of material and financial expansion. For Moore, the waves of material 
expansion hinge on the successful mobilization of the unpaid work of ‘Cheap Nature’ outside 
of the commodity system – namely cheap food, labour, energy and raw materials – into the 
sphere of accumulation. But when Cheap Nature is provisionally exhausted, profitability in 
productive activities declines and financialization ensues.  
According to Moore, phases of financialization, in turn, give way to new waves of imperialism 
and scientific breakthroughs which reinvigorate the intensified appropriation of Cheap Nature. 
And these developments propel extended phases of material expansion. However, Moore 
argues that at this current stage in the history of capitalism, the process of appropriation is 
nearing an asymptote as myriad phenomena such as the collapse in pollinator populations, the 
evermore resource-intensive forms of energy extraction, and the destabilization of the world’s 
climate indicate that Cheap Nature is edging towards terminal exhaustion. It is in this context 
that Moore makes sense of the financialization of the global economy over the last five decades: 
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the decline of Cheap Nature has led to diminished profitability in the sphere of production, and 
this diminished profitability has in turn led to expanded financial accumulation (Moore, 2015). 
For Moore, financialization is set to continue in the context of accelerating environmental 
degradation, and may signal a terminal crisis in capitalist profitability. From this perspective, 
he insists that ‘[g]lobal warming poses a fundamental threat not only to humanity, but, more 
immediately and directly, to capitalism itself’ (Moore, 2015, p. 290).  
While Moore offers the most ambitious theorization of the macro-level relationship between 
environmental degradation and financialization, other contributions provide more specific 
empirical insights into financial accumulation in the commodity sector. A key theme in this 
research is that the influx of financial actors in commodity markets may have exacerbated 
commodity price volatility in ways that have had significant distributional consequences 
(Baines, 2017; Clapp & Helleiner, 2012b; Newman, 2009). However, the literature most 
relevant for our purposes focuses on the commodity trading firms themselves. For example, 
Philip McMichael (2012) argues that in the context of accumulation crisis, as dramatized by 
the global financial crash of 2007-08, corporations such as ADM and Cargill sought to boost 
their profitability by speculating vast sums, on their own account or on behalf of third-party 
investors, in everything from derivatives to land and biofuels. This analysis is reaffirmed by 
detailed accounts of the financial activities within ADM, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus 
(Murphy et al., 2012; Salerno, 2017).  
Complementing this literature on agricultural commodity trading firms are recent analyses of 
the largest commodity traders in energy and metal markets. Andreas Goldthau and Llewelyn 
Hughes (2020) argue that the rise of the major oil traders – Glencore, Vitol and Trafigura – has 
been coeval with the financialization of the oil sector and the vertical disintegration of oil 
supply chains since the 1970s. As Goldthau and Hughes (2020, p. 11) contend, this process has 
led to growing homogenization in the sector, as oil majors’ trading activities increasingly 
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resemble those of commodity trading firms. The tendency towards homogenization has also 
been identified in metals markets where the largest physical traders, such as Glencore, 
established ‘trading arms that operated like financial institutions generating substantial 
financial-trading profits’ (Seddon, 2020, p. 543). 
 
Financialization as the rise of shareholder value  
Just as there is an emergent literature on the growing role of finance as a source of profits for 
firms operating in the commodity sector, there are also analyses examining finance as an 
increasingly important destination for profits through the process of shareholder value 
maximization (De los Reyes, 2017; Labban, 2014). Reflecting a common view in the literature 
on corporate financialization that the rise of financialized accumulation and shareholder value 
maximization are interconnected, Jennifer Clapp and S. Ryan Isakson (2018, p. 443) argue that 
agri-food firms ‘are encouraged by their shareholders to increase their financial activities as a 
means by which to improve their performance.’ 
Furthermore, in an analysis of equity holdings in the major agri-food corporations, including 
ADM and Bunge, Clapp (2019) argues that the considerable share of ownership taken up by 
the asset management firms may lead these agri-food firms to move their focus away from 
directly competing in product markets in favour of strategies aimed at boosting sector-wide 
profitability and returns. Such a shift, Clapp suggests, could come to the detriment of both 
consumers and farmers who may have to pay more for the products they purchase. It may also 
have broader social and ecological consequences as firms become locked into enhancing short-
term shareholder returns through deploying existing technologies rather than experimenting 
with ecologically restorative innovations (Clapp, 2019, p. 623).   
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There are also noteworthy analyses of the influence of shareholder value norms in the energy 
sector. For example, Paul Stevens (2016) argues that a key consequence of the prioritization of 
shareholder value is that oil companies have increasingly sought to minimize their costs 
through outsourcing oil extraction to medium-sized firms. Mazen Labban (2014) devotes 
attention to how this drive to minimize costs and maximize shareholder returns has led to 
significant layoffs among major oil companies. As Labban (2014, p. 487) argues, beyond 
outsourcing, mergers and acquisitions along with divestitures have been important vectors of 
shareholder value maximization as such practices enhance the scope for workforce reductions.   
Similar themes appear in the literature on shareholder value maximization in the mining sector 
where it has been found that institutional investors have pressured mining companies to 
increase shareholder returns (De los Reyes, 2017, pp. 252-254). During the boom in minerals 
prices from 2003 to 2011, these pressures led mining firms to increase capital investment, via 
mergers and acquisitions as well as greenfield and brownfield projects, in order to intensify 
production – frequently in a manner that caused significant disruption to surrounding 
communities (Bowman, 2018). This surging investment also led to more instability in the 
mining sector itself once firms found themselves overcommitted to mining activities during the 
subsequent slump in prices. In this context, there has been a heightened focus on cost-
minimization and divestiture to sustain shareholder payouts (De los Reyes, 2017, pp. 258-260), 
leading to a renewed drive to curb wages, lay-off workers and close the most labour-intensive 
mines (Bowman, 2018; Parker et al., 2017). The main contribution of this work is that it 
illuminates the interplay between growing commitments to shareholder value maximization, 
on the one hand, and the cyclicality of commodity markets, on the other. As this research shows, 
the ascent of shareholder value norms is not always concordant with an expansion of financial 
activity. In certain periods, firms may instead rapidly expand production to boost shareholder 
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returns, but often in ways that exacerbate financial fragility, social inequality and 
environmental destruction. 
To sum up, five key claims can be distilled from the existing literature. Firstly, from a world-
ecological perspective, financialization is set to continue in the context of accelerating 
environmental degradation, and may signal a terminal crisis in capitalist profitability. Secondly, 
in the context of the financialization of commodity markets, commodity trading firms have 
converged with other companies towards a financialized business model. Thirdly, shareholder 
value maximization is concordant with increased accumulation via financial activities as 
pressures to deliver shareholder returns encourage firms to engage in financial investment to 
boost profits. Fourthly, while fixed investment may increase during cyclical upswings in 
commodity prices, ongoing pressures to cut costs via outsourcing, layoffs and divestitures 
become more accentuated during cyclical downswings in commodity prices. Finally, the 
predominance of asset management companies in equity ownership reinforces commodity 
firms’ commitment to short-term returns over long-term social and environmental concerns. 
   
3. Who are the Major Commodity Trading Firms?  
So far, we have identified key claims in the existing literature on the financialization of 
commodity markets and trading firms. This literature raises important questions that we seek 
to address. Firstly, in what respects – if any – are the commodity trading firms becoming 
increasingly financialized? Is it through expanding financial activities, through distributing 
larger shares of company earnings to shareholders, or is it both? Secondly, what is the 
relationship between the financialization of accumulation and the maximization of shareholder 
value among the commodity trading firms? Thirdly, how does this relationship change in the 
context of commodity price cycles and concomitant shifts in company profitability?  Fourthly, 
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can financial activists successfully push commodity traders to reverse the ecological and social 
harms of their operations, or does corporate financialization inexorably lead firms to prioritize 
short-term financial returns over long-term social stability and ecological integrity?  
 
The existing scholarship offers important pointers in navigating these questions. However, it 
has not yet provided definitive answers. One reason for this is that much of the literature on the 
financialization of the commodity sector examines it from a macroscopic perspective; and the 
literature that does examine firm-level financialization either looks at companies adjacent to 
commodity trading firms in supply chains, such as mining or oil companies, or it looks at one 
particular subset of trading firms, such as the agricultural commodity traders or oil trading 
firms. Another reason for the uncertainty regarding the commodity trading firms’ business 
trajectories arises from the perceived paucity of data, especially with respect to the privately-
held trading houses (Isakson, 2015, p. 762; Murphy et al., 2012, p. 24). This has meant that no 
existing scholarship has gauged the degree to which the commodity trading firms have invested 
in financial assets and generated profits from financial activities, nor has it established the 
extent to which commodity trading firms have committed themselves to maximizing 
shareholder value.1 
 
In light of gaps in existing knowledge, we draw on data and company filings deposited in five 
key databases – Bloomberg Professional, Compustat, Orbis, Thomson Reuters Eikon and 
Thomson Reuters SDC – to provide the most comprehensive mapping of the financialization 
of the major commodity traders to date. Rather than focusing on just one sectoral subset of the 
commodity trading firms, our study departs from existing contributions by examining all the 
major commodity trading firms to better understand the specific dynamics of financialization 
as it pertains to each and every commodity sector, from agriculture, to metals and energy. 
13 
Specifically, we focus on the ten largest commodity trading firms ranked by revenues – ADM, 
Bunge, Cargill, COFCO, Glencore, Louis Dreyfus, Mercuria, Trafigura, Vitol and Wilmar – 
over a three-decade period spanning from the beginning of the 1990s to the end of the 2010s. 
We are confined to this time-period due to data constraints. Although we have relevant data on 
ADM going all the way back to 1950, data for the other firms only become accessible from 
1993 onwards. Despite these constraints, the original dataset we have compiled does offer the 
advantage of allowing us to trace shifts in the business models of these firms before, during 
and after the 2003-2011 commodity boom.  
 
The rationale for our choice of firms is more complex. In some respects, we are again 
circumscribed by limited data availability. For example, two firms which trade significant 
quantities of oil – Koch Industries and Gunvor – are so secretive that they rarely publish data 
on their net income, let alone more specific information directly related to their financial 
activities. Beyond these issues of data availability, we face selection dilemmas for firms which 
do publish relevant data as the boundaries of the commodity trading business are themselves 
blurred. Some of the major corporations described as commodity trading firms – such as Cargill 
and Louis Dreyfus – have distanced themselves from this characterization, and now 
increasingly identify themselves as ‘supply chain managers’ operating both upstream in the 
production of primary commodities, and downstream in the manufacture of consumer and 
industrial goods (Clapp, 2015; Kingsman, 2019). Another firm included in the dataset – 
Glencore – has departed even more radically from the traditional trading model to become an 
industrial conglomerate heavily engaged in mining activities. The Japanese general trading 
companies – the sōgō shōsha – are also of great importance in supplying commodities, 
especially in East Asia (see Figure A1). Nonetheless, they do not form part of our analysis 
because much of their revenue is generated from trading products beyond primary and 
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secondary commodity markets: from microchips, to construction machinery, to aircraft (Hiraga, 
2018). To complicate matters further, some companies that undertake significant commodity 
trading operations are subsidiaries within major mining and oil corporations, as well as banks 
(Omarova, 2013). In short, diversification and conglomeration mean that there is no precise 
way of delineating the major commodity traders. We therefore include the entities that either 
self-identify or are commonly identified – by governments, NGOs, the financial press and 
academic researchers – as commodity trading firms. 
  
With this in mind, Table 1 provides further information on the ten companies, including data 
on their revenues, their principal asset class, their ownership structure, and their major 
shareholders, bondholders and loan underwriters. The table clearly shows the diverse financial 
ties of each commodity trading firm. In terms of equity holdings, COFCO is a Chinese state-
owned enterprise. In contrast, ADM and Bunge’s key equity holders include US-headquartered 
asset management companies such as BlackRock and Vanguard (see also Clapp, 2019); 
whereas Glencore’s are the sovereign wealth fund, the Qatari Investment Agency, as well as 
the major asset management companies. Wilmar has a similarly diverse range of equity holders 
– from another commodity trader in ADM, to the extended family of the company’s co-founder 
and chairman, Kuok Khoon Hong. There is also considerable diversity among the private 
trading houses. The equity of Mercuria, Trafigura and Vitol Group is principally held by their 
senior employees, while the ownership structures of Cargill and Louis Dreyfus are primarily 
organized on familial lines. Cargill is presently controlled by around 100 descendants of 
William Wallace Cargill, the man who established the company over 150 years ago. There are 
currently more billionaires in this dynasty, 14 in total, than in any other family in the world 


























(percentage of outstanding  
debt, 2020) 
 
Leading loan underwriters  































1. DBS Group Holdings (6.0%) 
=2. Sumitomo Mitsui (5.9%) 
=2. Mitsubishi UFJ (5.9%) 
4. HSBC Holdings (5.2%) 
5. Mizuho Financial Group (5.1%) 







1. Qatar Investment Authority 
(9.2%) 
2. Ivan Glasenberg (9.1%) 
3. Harris Associates (5.6%) 
4. BlackRock Inc. (5.2%) 
5. Daniel Maté (3.4%) 
 
1. BlackRock Inc. (1.2%) 
2. Baird Financial Group (0.9%) 
3. JPMorgan Chase (0.8%) 
4. Lord Abbett & Co. (0.6%) 
5. Western Asset Management 
(0.5%) 
 
1. ING (7.0%) 
2. Société Générale (4.0%) 
=3. Santander Corp (3.7%) 
=3. Deutsche Bank (3.7%) 

























1. GAM Holding AG (6.0%) 
2. Invesco Ltd. (1.6%) 
3. Banque Lombard Odier (1.4%) 
4. Close Brothers Group (1.4%) 
5. Azimut Investments (0.5%) 
 
 
1. ING (18.8%) 
2. Standard Chartered (9.6%) 
3. Sumitomo Mitsui (9.5%) 
4. Bank of China (8.4%) 












1. 3 company executives (30.0%) 
2. Employees (20.2%) 
3. Marco Dunand (13.3%) 
4. ChemChina (12.0%) 










1. Sumitomo Mitsui (13.4%) 
2. Mizuho Financial (9.7%) 
3. ING (7.8%) 
4. ICBC (7.5%) 
5. Société Générale (7.0%) 
 
       
Cargill 113.5 Agriculture  Private 
(US) 
1. Cargill & MacMillan family 
(90.0%) 
2. Employee stock owners (8.0%) 




1. Charles Schwab Corp. (2.5%) 
2. Prudential Financial (2.2%) 
3. Wellington Management (1.7%) 
4. MetLife Investment (1.6%) 
5. BlackRock Inc. (1.5%) 
 
1. BNP Paribas (15.3%) 
=2. JP Morgan Chase (13.7%) 
=2. Bank of America (13.7%) 
=2. Citi (13.7%) 
5. Deutsche Bank (12.0%) 
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1. Dacheng Fund (0.8%) 
2. Banque Lombard Odier (0.6%) 
3. Great Wall Fund (0.4%) 
4. Schroder Investment (0.4%) 
5. Assicurazioni Generali (0.3%) 
 
=1. ICBC (4.0%) 
=1. Westpac Banking Corp. (4.0%) 
=1. Oversea-Chinese Bank (4.0%) 
=1. China Development Bank (4.0%) 











1. Vanguard Group (9.5%) 
2. State Fam Mutual (9.2%) 
3. BlackRock Inc. (6.7%)   
4. State Street Corp (6.2%) 
5. Wellington Management (4.1%) 
 
 
1. Prudential Financial (3.6%) 
2. BlackRock Inc. (3.1%) 
3. JPMorgan Chase (2.2%) 
4. Vanguard Group (2.0%) 
5. MetLife Investment (1.7%) 
 
 
=1. Bank of America (25.0%) 
=1. JP Morgan (25.0%) 
=1. Citi (25.0%) 
=1. Barclays (25.0%) 
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Wilmar 42.6 Agriculture Public 
(Singapore) 
1. ADM (22.2%) 
2. Kuok Brothers Sdn. Bhd. (18.6%) 
3. Kerry Group (5.8%) 
4. Longhlin Asia (5.4%) 








1. DBS Group Holdings (22.4%) 
2. United Overseas Bank (20.3%) 
=3. Mizuho Financial (11.4%) 
=3. Mitsubishi UFJ (11.4%) 
















1. T Rowe Price Group (11.2%) 
2. Vanguard Group (9.2%) 
3. BlackRock Inc. (6.5%) 
4. UBS AG (3.2%) 




1. Vanguard Group (3.2%) 
2. BlackRock Inc. (3.2%) 
3. Franklin Resources Inc. (2.5%) 
4. Dimensional Fund (2.2%) 
5. JPMorgan Chase (2.2%) 
 
 
1. Sumitomo Mitsui (14.5%) 
=2. US Bancorp (9.0%) 
=2. Citi (9.0%) 
=2. BNP Paribas (9.0%) 














1. Margarita Louis-Dreyfus (≈55.0%) 
2. Abu Dhabi Developmental 




1. DNCA Finance (2.8%) 
2. Montagu Private Equity (1.5%) 
3. Close Brothers Group (1.3%) 
4. BlackRock Inc. (1.2%) 
5. La Francaise AM (0.8%) 
 
 
1. ING (10.9%) 
2. Cooperatieve Rabobank (8.9%) 
3. Sumitomo Mitsui (7.8%) 
4. DBS Group Holdings (7.3%) 
5. Citi (6.5%) 
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Table 1: Major Commodity Traders’ Principal Asset Class, Ownership Structures and Linkages to Financial Markets 
 
Source: Bloomberg Professional (2020) and Thomson Reuters Eikon (2020) 
Note: Mercuria equity ownership data current as of 20th August 2018. All other data current as of 31st December 2020.  
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billionaire heir, Margarita Louis-Dreyfus, widow of the great grandson of the company’s 
founder. 
 
Before delving into the various metrics of financialization, it is worthwhile examining the 
overall profitability of the ten commodity trading firms to provide some context for our analysis. 
To this end, Figure 1 presents the differential profits of these companies. Conceived by 
Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (2009), this measure gauges the profitability of any one 
group of firms against a benchmarked ‘average’. For the purposes of this research, differential 
profits are calculated by dividing the annual net income of the commodity traders by the 
corresponding annual average net income of firms in the Compustat 1000: the 1000 largest US-
headquartered, non-financial companies in the Compustat database ranked by net income (for 
further details on the compilation of the Compustat 1000 dataset see Table A1). The bottom 
chart in Figure 1 presents the differential profits of the commodity traders as staggered averages 
because the net income data for each firm is not co-extensive for the period of interest. As such, 
the solid line in the bottom panel that starts from 1993 tracks the weighted average net income 
of Cargill and ADM relative to the Compustat 1000 as these are the only firms in this study 
with net income data available from 1993 through to 2019. In 1995, Vitol is then added, and 
this iterative process is continued so that the net income of all the trading firms is eventually 
incorporated into the analysis. The top chart presents the inflation-adjusted price levels and 
volatility of the Thomson Commodity Price Index.  
 
As Figure 1 shows, there is a clear long-term trajectory which is discernible for the major 
commodity traders. Beginning from low levels at the turn of the twenty-first century, their 
differential profits rose to a peak in 2008 and declined thereafter. Moreover, this pattern 
broadly mirrors the commodity price dynamics in the same period: surging profits coincided 
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Figure 1. Commodity Trading Firms’ Differential Profitability and Commodity Price 
Instability  
Source: Bloomberg Professional (2020), Compustat (2020), Global Financial Data (2020) and 
Thomson Reuters Eikon (2020) 
 
Note: Commodity prices are represented by the Thomson Reuters Core Commodity CRB 
Index, and are inflation-adjusted by Global Financial Data. Commodity price volatility is the 
standard deviation of the weekly rate of change of commodity prices in an annual-moving 
window, and commodity price levels are presented as one-year moving averages. Series data 
are smoothed to 2-year moving averages. Series code for Compustat 1000: ni. 
 
 
with elevated price levels and heightened volatility. The trading houses tend to thrive during 
periods of price instability in large part because of their unparalleled reach into global trade 
flows. As they are privy to myriad streams of commercially relevant information, commodity 
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the price discovery lead tends to widen as the commodity traders take advantage of the 
disorientation of other entities. Growing informational asymmetries afford commodity traders 
the opportunity of navigating profit opportunities through arbitrage, speculation or the 
increased provision of risk-management services to less informed entities (Baines, 2017; 
Murphy et al., 2012; Staritz et al., 2018).  
 
The view that commodity trading firms can benefit greatly from instability is widely accepted 
among insiders of the commodity trading business itself. To take one example (for others see 
e.g. Jenkins, 2018, p. 15; Kingsman, 2019, p. 147), in a report titled ‘The Value in Volatility’ 
produced by Deutsche Bank on the eve of Glencore’s initial public offering in 2011 it was 
argued:  
‘The increasing frequency of extreme weather events and the likelihood of more 
political intervention (such as export bans) in commodities will further exacerbate the 
trend of increasing volatility in our view. As commodities gain popularity as an asset 
class, the financial aspect of demand, which is arguably more susceptible to changes in 
sentiment will also continue to amplify volatility in our view. Commodity price 
volatility may not suit the pure producers, and increased volatility could arguably lead 
to an equity de-rating. However … Glencore’s trading business actually benefits 
directly from the volatility and we believe the equity could out-perform in periods of 
volatility.’ (Sporre et al. 2011, p. 6) 
The bullish sentiment articulated in this passage, along with the soaring differential profits at 
the height of the commodity boom as recorded in Figure 1, serve as a stark reminder that the 
exhaustion of Cheap Nature and the ongoing financialization of accumulation that Jason Moore 
sees as prefigured in the last commodity boom will have highly uneven effects. Rather than 
simply spelling doom for capital in general, there are some corporations – the commodity 
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trading firms foremost among them – which are well positioned to benefit from the turmoil. 
Indeed, the salience of extreme weather and geopolitical turbulence has only increased since 
the publication of Deutsche Bank’s report. In view of the gathering storm, the remainder of the 
article proceeds in two steps. The next section examines the changes undergone by the major 
commodity trading firms with respect to the two key facets of corporate financialization 
emphasized in the literature: the financialization of accumulation and the rise of shareholder 
value norms. And the subsequent section investigates whether processes of financialization 
may actually create new opportunities via financial activism to push commodity trading firms 
to reverse the ecological and social harms of their operations.   
 
 
4. Mapping Financialization of the Commodity Trading Firms (I): Accumulation 
 
How does one assess the degree to which corporate accumulation has become financialized? 
Some researchers proceed by analysing shifts in company asset structures (e.g. Davis, 2018; 
Rabinovich, 2019). Using this scholarship as our lead, we examine the physical asset intensity 
of commodity traders to determine how tangible fixed assets as a percentage of total assets 
have changed through time. This can be seen as an inverse proxy for the financialization of 
firm-level accumulation: the lower the physical asset intensity, the higher the degree of 
financialization, and vice versa. A decline in physical assets as a percentage of total assets 
relates to financialization in that it reflects the substitution of financial investment for ‘real’ 
investment (Baud & Durand, 2012; Krippner, 2012). This aspect of financialization is 
particularly relevant to our analysis as the existing literature maintains that the agricultural 
commodity traders are expanding their financial activities and becoming more like financial 
firms (Murphy et al., 2012, p. 5; Salerno, 2017, p. 215).   
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The top panel of Figure 2 displays the data separately for each of the ten trading companies, 
while the bottom panel presents the data as staggered averages alongside the corresponding 
metric for the Compustat 1000. Data in the top panel indicate considerable diversity among the 
commodity trading firms (see Figure A2 for a more granular picture of the commodity trading 
firms’ balance sheets). The privately-held traders – Mercuria, Trafigura and Vitol – are the 




Figure 2. Commodity Trading Firms’ Physical Asset Intensity 
  
Source: Compustat (2020), Bloomberg Professional (2020) and Orbis (2020) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the average values for 2010-2019. Series data are smoothed 
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converged on asset-medium business models (see also Pirrong, 2014). The publicly-listed 
energy and minerals trading firm Glencore is unique. The sharp rise in its physical asset 
intensity is chiefly attributable to its US$30 billion acquisition of mining giant Xstrata in 2013, 
the largest ever commodities transaction outside of the oil sector (Blas, 2013).  
 
There are also other significant shifts in the commodity traders’ asset structures, which are less 
clearly registered in Figure 2. Specifically, in response to falling trading margins brought by 
increasing price transparency and declining price volatility, the privately-held trading firms 
expanded in other parts of the energy and minerals supply chain between 2010 and 2014 in 
search for profits. Trafigura acquired key storage and distribution assets in Australia to become 
the country’s largest independent fuel retailer, Vitol massively expanded its oil refining and 
petrol distribution network in Africa through a series of deals with Royal Dutch Shell, and 
Mercuria bought up the physical commodity trading operations of JPMorgan, including its 
large-scale metal warehousing facilities (Prosser, 2011; Trafigura, 2013; Zhdannikov and 
Antonioli, 2014). Tellingly, these shifts led the business consultancy Oliver Wyman to herald 
a new era characterized by ‘the industrialization of commodity trading’ – an altogether different 
narrative to that advanced in the financialization literature on the trading firms (Franke et al., 
2015). To reinforce this point about incipient trends in industrialization in the commodity 
trading sector, it is worth examining the staggered averages in Figure 2. They indicate that 
physical asset intensity was generally declining during the onset of the commodity boom in the 
2000s. However, by the 2010s there was a flattening out in this trend, just as there has been 
with the Compustat 1000. This indicates that the financialization of the commodity trading 
firms’ asset structures has levelled-off and in some cases been reversed.  
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Beyond examining the changing asset structures of the commodity traders, how else might we 
go about measuring the extent to which these companies are engaging in financialized forms 
of accumulation? One possible route is to follow other studies of non-financial firms and 
determine the degree to which commodity traders generate income from their financial 
divisions as well as from interest payments and dividends (e.g. Davis, 2018; Rabinovich, 2019; 
Orhangazi, 2008). Metrics for the commodity traders’ financial division income are presented 
in Figure 3, and metrics for their interest and dividend income are included in the Appendix 
(Figures A3 and A4). As we can see in Figure 3, only three commodity traders have reported 
financial division income – Cargill, ADM and COFCO – so we have to be circumspect in 
gleaning general insights from these data. Nonetheless, what we find is that Cargill’s financial 
division appeared to peak in importance in 2001 – contributing a staggering 68% of the firm’s 
net profits, but by 2013 the financial division’s contribution to net profits fell to 14%. The 
contribution of ADM’s financial division to operating income peaked at 13% in 2004 and 
remained at elevated levels until the peak of the commodity boom in 2008, after which it was 
never able to significantly recover. COFCO’s financial division has also seen its share of 
company gross profits fall from 2.1% in 2013 to 0.5% in 2017. As the bottom chart in Figure 
3 shows, these developments resemble longer running trends in the de-financialization of 
profits among the Compustat 1000 (see also Rabinovich, 2019; Soener, 2020).  
 
The declining contribution of the three commodity traders’ financial divisions to overall profits 
is reflective of broader trends in commodity trading away from some financial activities in the 
context of diminished profitability in the mid-2010s (Terazono, 2015). In 2015, Bunge span- 
off its private equity operations as part of a broader shutdown of its asset management activities 
(Singh and Rowling, 2015). And one year later, Cargill completed the closure of its private 
equity arm, Black River Asset Management, as it sought to renew its focus on its own core 
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competencies. This shift in focus culminated in Cargill moving out of the fund management 
business altogether with the sale of it assess management company, CarVal Investors, in 2019 
(Meyer, 2019). Similarly, in 2017 Louis Dreyfus closed down Edesia Asset Management, 
 
 
Figure 3. Commodity Trading Firms’ Financial Divisions  
 
Source:  Bloomberg Professional (2020) and Compustat (2020) 
 
Note: Cargill time-series is segment net income as a percentage of total net income and 
COFCO time-series is segment gross profits as a percentage of total gross profits as segment 
operating profit data for these two companies are unavailable. Figures in parentheses are the 
average values for 2010-2019. Series data are smoothed to 2-year moving 
averages. Operating profits for Compustat 1000 is defined simply as the sum of net income, 







































 which was at the time one of the largest commodity hedge funds in the world (Kingsman, 
2018). Echoing the explanations offered by other major commodity trading firms that 
downsized their financial operations during this period, Louis Dreyfus stated that their decision 
to close Edesia Asset Management was ‘in line with the group’s strategic decision to focus its 
resources on its core physical operations as a merchant and processor of agricultural goods’ 
(cited by Reuters, 2017). 
 
Overall, then, we find that the accumulation patterns of commodity trading firms are highly 
variegated, but that the general trend towards declining physical asset intensity abated in the 
2010s. Furthermore, according to available data on financial income streams, the accumulation 
of the commodity trading firms was less financialized in the 2010s than in the previous decade. 
The shift away from financial activities is further evidenced by the expanded physical footprint 
of the major energy and mineral trading firms in the first half of the 2010s, and the closure of 
many financial operations by the agricultural commodity traders in the second half of the 2010s. 
That these shifts took place in the context of diminished profitability has key conceptual 
implications. While Moore argues that diminished profitability may lead to a shift towards 
more financial activities for capital in general; for the major commodity trading firms, at least, 
depressed profits in their trading operations have led to the reverse: a strategic reorientation 
away from financial activities and a renewed focus on their physical supply chains.  
 
 
5. Mapping Financialization of the Commodity Trading Firms (II): Shareholder Value 
 
In the previous section we explored the first facet of financialization emphasized in the 
literature – the rise of financial activities – and we found evidence that suggests that during the 
2010s the major commodity trading firms have actually been de-financializing in this respect. 
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But what about shareholder value norms? Have these norms suffused all the commodity traders 
so that more value is distributed to equity holders via dividends and stock buybacks? And what 
impact might such norms have on corporate practices of acquisition and divestiture before,  
during and after the commodity boom?  
 
Figure 4 helps us begin to answer these questions by presenting the shareholder payout ratio 
(dividend payments and stock buybacks as a share of net income), a metric used to gauge the 
degree of shareholder value enhancement (e.g. Milberg, 2008, pp. 438-439). The top panel 
indicates that rising shareholder value norms are to varying degrees evident in commodity 
trading firms of all types – whether they be public, private or state-owned. Publicly-listed 
Bunge, ADM and Glencore and privately-held Vitol have distributed the most to equity-holders: 
respectively disbursing 76%, 73%, 72% and 71% of net income in dividends and stock 
buybacks from 2010-19. Meanwhile privately-held Cargill, state-owned COFCO, and publicly-
listed Wilmar have distributed the least in the same period: 24%, 29% and 31% respectively. 
In the bottom panel with the staggered averages, we see that there have been two waves of 
shareholder payouts for the commodity traders, reaching a peak at the turn of the twentieth 
century, only to surge to new heights in the second half of the 2010s. Indeed, the shareholder 
payout ratio for all but one of the major commodity traders for which we have data peaked 
from 2015-19, and every staggered average reaches a climax during this period as well, 
indicating a clear upward trend that converges with the payout commitments of the Compustat 
1000 as a whole. These data therefore lend strong support to the view that the commodity 
traders have become more financialized in terms of their shareholder value orientation.  
 
According to the literature on corporate financialization, a likely corollary of this trend towards 
shareholder value enhancement is increased dependence on subcontracting as a means of 
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minimizing costs and externalizing risk. Although comprehensive data on subcontracting 
activities are elusive, there is considerable evidence that subcontracting does play a significant 
role in the business models of commodity trading firms, often in ways that are injurious to 
human rights and harmful to the environment. For example, it has been revealed that Glencore 
outsources mining operations to cooperatives that employ child labour in conditions where fatal 
accidents are commonplace (Kollbrunner, 2020). Similarly, agricultural trading firms such as 
 
 
Figure 4. Commodity Trading Firms’ Shareholder Payouts  
 
Source: Bloomberg Professional (2020) and Compustat (2020)  
 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the average values for 2010-2019. Series data are smoothed 



















percent percentShareholder Payout Ratio































Wilmar have been found to source significant quantities of palm oil from ‘shadow companies,’ 
which are not subject to its social and environmental commitments (Chain Reaction Research, 
2018). And in South America, an apparent strategic ignorance about the provenance of the 
oilseeds and grains that they process has long been exhibited by major agricultural traders to 
distance themselves from responsibility for deforestation and human rights abuses. Although 
such knowledge limitations could be overcome through more robust tracing practices, this 
would be costly and thereby militate against shareholder value priorities (Freidberg, 2017). 
 
Table 2 teases out some of the implications of shareholder value advancement for company 
acquisitions policy by presenting the number of firms in which the ten commodity traders 
acquired 50% or more of equity in five-year periods from 1990 to 2019. Table 3 looks at  
corresponding patterns of company divestiture policy, presenting the number of subsidiaries  
 
 
Table 2. The Number of Acquisitions of Commodity Trading Firms, 1990-2019  
 
Source: Thomson Reuters SDC (2020) 
 
Note: Only companies in which the commodity trading firm has bought at least 50% of 


















        
ADM 3 9 8 10 7 13 50 
Bunge 0 4 8 12 10 4 38 
Cargill 16 20 19 14 28 16 113 
COFCO 1 1 1 5 10 6 24 
Glencore 0 8 10 8 21 3 50 
Louis Dreyfus 8 6 6 8 11 0 39 
Mercuria - - 0 3 5 4 12 
Trafigura 0 0 1 0 5 2 8 
Vitol 2 2 0 4 3 3 14 
Wilmar 0 6 1 15 7 3 32 
        
Total  30 56 54 79 107 54  
29 
for which the ten commodity traders sold 50% or more of equity during the same period.2 As 
suggested above, research on the financialization of mining firms shows that shareholder 
pressures accentuated pro-cyclical dynamics of increased acquisitions in the upsurge of 
commodity booms, and increased divestitures during subsequent downswings. Table 2  
indicates pro-cyclical dynamics with acquisitions peaking either in 2005-09 or 2010-14, when 
commodity prices were at elevated levels, for nine of the ten major commodity traders. 
Moreover, Table 3 suggests that, at least at an aggregate level, divestitures reached their highest 
levels when commodity prices were depressed: from 1995-1999 and 2015-19. Interestingly, 
these figures conform with our findings in the previous sub-section: with energy and mineral 
commodity traders acquiring large-scale industrial assets in 2010-14; and agricultural 


















        
ADM 0 1 0 3 1 1 6 
Bunge 1 5 3 0 4 0 13 
Cargill 4 7 9 6 7 12 45 
COFCO 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 
Glencore 0 1 0 3 1 4 9 
Louis Dreyfus 0 2 1 2 1 1 7 
Mercuria - - 0 0 1 0 1 
Trafigura 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Vitol 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 
Wilmar 0 2 0 3 1 0 6 
        
Total  5 21 14 17 19 20  
 
Table 3. The Number of Divestitures of Commodity Trading Firms, 1990-2019  
 
Source: Thomson Reuters SDC (2020) 
 
Note: Only subsidiaries from which the commodity trading firm has sold at least 50% of 
equity are included. 
 
 
   
The major agricultural commodity traders have engaged in the vast majority of divestitures 
with Cargill alone accounting for no less than 47% of sell-offs among the ten major commodity 
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traders between 1990 and 2019. The processes of rationalization not only led to the closure of 
significant financial operations, they also involved significant layoffs and wage retrenchment 
in supply chains, especially in the aftermath of the commodity boom. This has contributed to 
heightened antagonisms between trading firms and dockyard and meatpacking workers in 
North America (Brenner & Weissman, 2014; Heyman, 2015; Kurtz, 2018), as well as 
nationwide strike actions by port employees and workers operating in the agricultural 
commodity traders’ grain and oilseed supply chains in Argentina (Tomas, 2018; 2019). Despite 
the complex transformations of the commodity trading firms, many of the insights regarding 
financialization and labour relations offered in the literature on the mining and oil industries 
thus appear to apply to the commodity traders themselves.  
 
Taken together, our mapping of the commodity trading firms indicates that they are diverse, 
and that the financialization of these companies is highly variegated. Furthermore, when taken 
as a whole, we have shown the two most widely used registers to discern corporate 
financialization – the rise of accumulation via financial activities, and the ascendency of 
shareholder value norms – are disconsonant. While some trading firms are becoming less 
financialized in terms of the source of their profits, they are becoming more financialized in 
terms of the destination of profits, with dividend and share repurchase commitments reaching 
new heights after 2015. What is the significance of these findings? Will the commodity trading 
firms’ intensified commitment to shareholder value mean that they will continue to prioritize 
short-term returns over long-term environmental and social concerns? Or can the commodity 
traders’ linkages to capital markets be leveraged by groups aiming to reverse the environmental 




6. Regulating the Commodity Traders: Strategies in the Context of Financialization  
 
The existing literature has documented how, in the realm of public governance, commodity 
traders have successfully pushed back against regulatory initiatives to curb potentially 
destabilizing derivatives trading in the wake of the global financial crisis and commodity price 
spikes between 2007 and 2011 (Baines, 2017; Helleiner, 2018; Pagliari, 2018). However, few 
scholars have examined the limitations and possibilities of private governance with regard to 
the commodity trading firms (Schleifer & Sun, 2018). In this respect, financial activism has 
emerged as one promising strategy for pushing these firms to commit to private governance 
programmes aimed at curtailing ecologically and socially destructive business practices 
(MacLeod & Park, 2011). There are two main forms that financial activism can take. Through 
the use of ‘voice’, shareholders can put forth resolutions and vote at company annual meetings. 
Through the use of ‘exit’, shareholders and creditors can shape company policy by threatening 
to divest and discontinue credit. Exploring the limits and possibilities of these strategies allows 
us to better grasp potential paradoxes of financialization. While some facets of financialization 
may fuel the destructive behaviour of commodity trading firms, it may also open up ways for 
shareholders and creditors to pressure companies to reign in that destructive behaviour. 
 
Shareholder Resolutions 
We begin by considering shareholder resolutions, which investors can put forward at annual 
meetings to steer company policies. Perhaps stating the obvious, shareholder resolutions are 
unlikely to have much of an impact on the behaviour of most commodity trading firms simply 
because of their ownership structures. Table 1 revealed that in terms of equity holdings, the 
preponderance of private and state ownership, founding families, senior employees and 
managers, as well as individuals and entities closely connected to commodity trading shields 
most of these companies from the pressures of activist shareholders.  
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Of the ten major commodity trading firms, only two – ADM and Bunge – are owned in any 
significant way by outside shareholders with no clear connection to commodity trading. Here 
we see that the equity of ADM and Bunge is dominated by giant asset managers, including the 
‘big three’ of BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard (see also Clapp, 2019). The big three have 
gained a reputation as ‘passive investors’ merely following an index (Fichtner et al., 2017), but 
in recent years have pledged to use resolutions and voting against management to register their 
dissatisfaction with businesses that fail to improve environmental and social governance 
(Kerber, 2016; Flood, 2017). Critics have dismissed these pronouncements as hollow and argue 
that, in the case of BlackRock, increasing ‘green’ rhetoric has actually coincided with 
decreasing support for environmental resolutions (Mooney, 2020).   
 
According to data we compiled from Proxy Insight (2020), between 2010 and 2019, there was 
only one shareholder resolution put to vote at ADM and one at Bunge aiming towards ESG 
improvements, out of a total of 148 shareholder votes and 80 shareholder votes at these two 
companies, respectively. The shareholder resolution at ADM was put forward in 2011, and 
proposed the establishment of a target date for sourcing 100% certified sustainable palm oil, 
new plans for verifying supplier compliance, and a moratorium on palm oil expansion in 
peatlands and rainforests (Ceres, 2020). The resolution attracted only 4.2% votes in its favour, 
with BlackRock’s funds voting against the resolution, State Street abstaining, and Vanguard 
not voting at all (Proxy Insight, 2020). Similarly, the shareholder resolution that was submitted 
to Bunge’s annual meeting in 2015 proposed a time-bound plan to eliminate the contribution 
of its supply chain to expansion in peatlands, the clearing of ‘high conservation value’ or ‘high 
carbon stock’ forests, and human rights abuses. The resolution gained 29.3% votes in its favour, 
but tellingly all the funds of the three major asset management companies voted against the 
resolution (Ceres, 2020; Proxy Insight, 2020).  
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The reluctance of the three major asset management firms to pursue significant progress in 
environmental and social governance in the wider commodity sector is further reflected in our 
own research which shows that they voted in favour of only 10.7% of shareholder resolutions 
aiming for ESG-improvements in commodity firms between 2014 and 2019. In contrast, they 
voted in favour of no less than 95.9% of management resolutions seeking approval for dividend 
payments and stock buybacks (see Table A2). These data indicate that the asset management 
firms are more likely to use their influence to validate continued shareholder returns rather than 
mobilize behind strategies for ESG improvements which might diminish such returns. To the 
extent that the pursuit of short-term returns leads to socially injurious and ecologically 
damaging practices brought by outsourcing, cost-cutting and other activities, the major asset 
companies’ continual embrace of shareholder value may – in spite of their rhetoric of 
sustainability – reinforce the trading firms’ destructive tendencies. 
 
At the same time, the failed passage of the shareholder resolutions at ADM and Bunge has been 
mitigated by successful shareholder engagement with these two companies through other ESG 
resolutions, which were withdrawn after securing commitments from management. For ADM, 
this entailed obtaining agreements from management between 2014 and 2019 to impose 
sustainability reporting requirements on suppliers, and for the company to produce reports on 
deforestation impacts and renewable energy goals. Similarly, for Bunge, the engagement led 
to management committing to reports on environmental impacts (Ceres, 2020). Importantly, it 
was not the big asset managers that drew up these resolutions that eventually elicited manager 
commitments, but state pension funds, ESG-centred mutual fund networks and organizations 
representing church-based endowments. It is also worth noting that the commitments secured 
from both ADM and Bunge are rather limited in scope: reporting and disclosure tend to be 
emphasized over pledges to curb deforestation; and where concrete commitments to limit 
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deforestation exist, they tend to come without an explicit timeframe, and they tend to focus on 
illegal deforestation only (Drost et al., 2017; Steinweg et al., 2018). Without significant support 
from the major equity owners of ADM and Bunge, not least the three big asset management 
companies, the potential for more wide-ranging shareholder initiatives to improve ESG appears 




What about divestment as an alternative strategy of financial activism to curb the destructive 
behaviour of commodity trading firms? While the majority of divestment campaigns have been 
directed toward tobacco, weapons, and fossil fuel companies, activists are now setting their 
sights on the commodity trading firms, calling on shareholders, creditors and underwriters to 
use the traders’ dependence on equity and debt markets to drive ESG improvements 
(Greenpeace, 2017). But the efficacy of equity divestment is limited for the same reasons as 
shareholder resolutions: there are not many trading firms which rely significantly on financing 
from shareholders external to the commodity trade. Furthermore, despite the ecological 
devastation in which the commodity trading firms are involved, major asset companies appear 
unwilling to engage in bold divestment initiatives. For example, BlackRock announced a 
widely vaunted new climate plan in January 2020, which entails reducing exposure to coal 
mining companies. But BlackRock has no intention of divesting from Glencore, despite the 
fact that it extracts more coal than coal mining giants BHP Billiton and Anglo American 
combined (Biesheuvel, 2020).3 
 
There are also challenges to bringing about ESG improvements via credit divestment strategies. 
As Table 1 shows, bond ownership is widely dispersed, and this is likely to create collective 
action problems for bondholders that may want to influence the behaviour of commodity 
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traders. We also see in Table 1 that the distribution of loan underwriting is more concentrated. 
Underwriting may therefore offer opportunities for activists to demand that banks withhold 
these services to commodity traders that show no signs of improving their environmental and 
social governance. Yet even this facet of divestment is limited by the fact that many of the 
commodity traders have been deleveraging in recent years as shown in Figure 5 – with the 
staggered average leverage ratio falling below that of the Compustat 1000. According to the 
sustainability risk think tank, Chain Reaction Research, such debt reduction limits the financing 
risks that commodity trading firms experience from divestment threats (Drost et al., 2019, p. 
15). Moreover, these threats might be further blunted by shadow banking activities among 
commodity traders, such as receivables securitization in which companies take assets off their 
balance sheets and sell them as securities so as to raise funds (see Table A3). As these shadow 
banking activities obviate standard practices of company disclosure, they make it even more 
difficult for activist investors to trace the commodity traders’ manifold sources of financing.  
 
Given these considerations, we remain sceptical about the potential of financial activism to 
pressure commodity trading firms into adopting forms of private governance that would reverse 
the socially and ecologically harmful effects of their activities. Shareholder resolutions 
focusing on ESG improvements which gain majority votes are often rather unambitious and 
limited to improving reporting and disclosure requirements. And even when shareholder 
resolutions do lead to positive engagement from corporations, such responses may forestall 
more fundamental challenges to environmentally and socially damaging business practices 
(Neville et al., 2019, p. 126). Similarly, divestment campaigns may pose reputational risks to 
commodity trading firms, but these risks are attenuated by the myriad financing options open 
to these companies. As long as direct or indirect involvement in destructive practices – from 
coal mining to deforestation – remains profitable for commodity trading firms, securing 
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financing will likely be assured unless stringent public regulations on company financing and 
supply chain management are in place (Campos & Locatelli, 2020; Neville, 2020).   
 
 
Figure 5. Commodity Trading Firms’ Leverage 
 
Source: Bloomberg Professional (2020), Compustat (2020) and Orbis (2020) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the average values for 2010-2019. Series data are smoothed 




7. Conclusion  
 
The commodity trading firms play a pivotal role within global supply chains. While supporters 










































1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
ADM (19%) Bunge (26%)
Cargill (21%) COFCO (39%)
Glencore (32%) Louis Dreyfus (41%)
Mercuria (36%) Trafigura (56%)
Vitol (n.a.) Wilmar (51%)
percent percent
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markets, critics point to the ecological and social harms in which commodity traders are 
implicated. As such, it is important that these firms are effectively conceptualized and 
empirically investigated. The small body of existing scholarship on the major commodity 
trading firms has used the concept of financialization to make sense of their transformations. 
Through engaging with this literature, and through mapping the changes undergone by the 
commodity trading firms, the article offers several key insights.  
 
Firstly, we have demonstrated that the changes undergone by commodity trading firms are 
more complex and nuanced than is sometimes implied in existing analysis of corporate 
financialization. Like other verbal nouns ending in the suffix ‘ization’ – such as modernization 
or globalization – the concept of financialization is suggestive of change along discernible 
patterns from one condition to another (Steger, 2005, p. 13). But as we have indicated, the 
trading firms are diverse entities, and on an individual level their transformations do not 
straightforwardly accord with linear conceptions of change implicit in some scholarship on 
corporate financialization (see Christophers, 2015). Furthermore, when taken as a whole, we 
have shown that the two most widely used registers to discern corporate financialization – the 
rise of accumulation via financial activities, and the ascendency of shareholder value norms – 
are incongruent. While commodity trading firms have exhibited an intensifying shareholder 
orientation through time, the accumulation strategies of many of the trading firms have become 
less financialized. These findings complicate the view commonly held in the literature on 
corporate financialization that the maximization of shareholder value and the financialization 
of accumulation run in parallel.  
 
In some respects, the discordance between financial accumulation and shareholder payouts is 
reflected in the transformations of major non-financial corporations in general. The attentive 
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reader will note that the major non-financial corporations – proxied by the Compustat 1000 – 
peaked in terms of financial accumulation in the late 1990s (see also Rabinovich, 2019; Soener, 
2020). They then became less financialized along this register in the 2000s and 2010s, and 
became more financialized in terms of shareholder payouts. The apparent incongruence 
between the two key parameters for financialization should perhaps be unsurprising. One 
feature of shareholder value norms is an emphasis on firms streamlining their operations and 
refocusing on their core competencies (Milberg, 2008), and this sometimes may entail 
downsizing financial activities. Such a refocusing on core operations certainly seems to have 
occurred among the commodity trading firms in the 2010s. Furthermore, the fact that this 
reorientation took place in the context of diminished profitability is telling. Moore, in line with 
many other critical scholars of financialization, argues that diminished profitability may lead 
to a shift towards more financial activities for capital in general. But for the major commodity 
trading firms, at least, depressed profits have led to the reverse: a strategic reorientation away 
from financial activities and a renewed focus on their physical supply chains.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this article to establish whether such a strategic shift away from 
ancillary financial activities to core operations has taken place in other sectors. But the broader 
implication of our analysis is that the financialization of non-financial corporations should 
never be presupposed, and must instead be carefully parsed and empirically investigated. To 
succumb to the reflex of simply ascribing ever-more ‘financialization’ to particular 
corporations or ‘financialization’ in particular sectors without carefully articulating its 
parameters risks devaluing the conceptual currency of financialization itself (Mader et al., 2020, 
p. 3). As our findings on acquisitions and divestitures indicate, existing research on 
financialization in the commodity sector offers important pointers in navigating the complex 
terrain of commodity trading, not least in the emphasis it gives to the ways in which commodity 
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price cycles intersect with shareholder priorities. But more work needs to be done to further 
advance our understanding of the variegated dynamics of financialization in the commodity 
sector and beyond.  
 
Finally, we have found that in the context of variegated corporate financialization, there are 
several sources of commodity trader resilience in the face of financial activist pressures to 
reduce their harmful social and ecological impacts. The predominance of private ownership 
among the major commodity trading firms shields many of them from equity divestment 
campaigns. The threat of debt divestment is attenuated by the general dispersion of holdings in 
the commodity traders’ bonds, as well as the deleveraging and increased use of shadow banking 
by several major trading firms in recent years. Given the weakness of divestment threats, the 
commodity trading firms may not feel significant pressure to curb ecological destruction and 
human rights abuses in their supply chains. Furthermore, we have found little evidence from 
shareholder voting data that the major asset management companies are pushing commodity 
traders to improve environmental and social governance. Shareholder resolutions aimed at ESG 
improvements among the commodity trading firms are few and far between. And the voting 
patterns of the major asset management firms in commodity sector resolutions indicate that 
they continue to value increasing dividend payouts and stock buybacks more than combatting 
ecologically and socially harmful activities within commodity supply chains.   
 
Our intention is not to dismiss the efforts of activist investors to address problems relating to 
the commodity trading firms. Attempts at mobilizing pressures within financial channels 
should and must expand. But we submit that these efforts ought to be complemented with other 
forms of mobilization that extend beyond financial activism to encompass direct support for 
indigenous protest movements, pipeline blockades, consumer advocacy campaigns, electoral 
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coalition-building, labour organizing, and all manner of other activities. Just as the commodity 
trading firms are protean and inexhaustibly dynamic in their business practices, so too must 
our efforts to check their power be multifaceted and relentless. The future of the planet may 
depend on it.   
 
Notes 
1. One exception is a working paper by Peter Gibbon (2014), which maps various 
financialization metrics for commodity trading firms. Gibbon’s investigation uses brief 
snapshots and does not examine shareholder value maximization. Our work builds on 
Gibbon’s efforts by expanding the temporal scope of analysis and exploring additional 
facets of financialization. 
2. Ideally, we would present the value of these deals, but as the amounts exchanged in 
many of these transactions are not publicly disclosed, we offer a simple count of them 
instead. 
3. BlackRock has pledged to divest from its portfolios all companies that derive more than 
25% of their revenues from thermal coal. Glencore is the largest shipper of coal in the 
world, but falls well below BlackRock’s threshold as thermal coal accounts for less 
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Figure A1. Average Physical Asset Intensity and Revenues of Firms with Major 
Commodity Trading Operations, 2010-19  
  
Source: Bloomberg Professional (2020), Orbis (2020) and Thomson Reuters Eikon (2020)  
 
Note: The asset data for Vitol only covers the period 2010-2016. The revenue and asset data 
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Data item (mnemonic) Exclude firm from a given year if 
variable observation missing, or impute 
zero to the variable? 
Assets – Total (at) Exclude 
Debt in Current Liabilities (dlc) Exclude 
Dividends – Total (dvt) Impute Zero 
Equity in Earnings – Unconsolidated Subsidiaries (esub) Impute Zero 
Income Taxes – Current (txc) Exclude 
Interest and Related Expense – Total (xint) Exclude 
Interest and Related Income – Total (idit) Impute Zero 
Long-Term Debt (dltt) Exclude 
Operating Profit – Segment (ops) Impute Zero 
Plant, Property and Equipment – Total (ppent) Exclude 
Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock (prstkc) Impute Zero 
Revenue – Total (revt) Exclude 
 
Table A1. Description of Variables and Filtering Procedures for Compustat 1000 
 
Note: The Compustat 1000 represents the 1000 largest non-financial firms headquartered in 
the US as ranked by net income. Our dataset for the Compustat 1000 therefore comprises 
30,000 firm-year observations over the period from 1990 to 2019. We have followed a strict 
filtering procedure that aims to eliminate problematic entries while maximizing the 
representativeness of the Compustat 1000 firms. To filter out financial firms, we have excluded 
all corporations with a Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code starting with ‘6’. To filter 
out all foreign corporations we have only included firms with an ISO country code for their 
headquarters (LOC) of ‘USA’. To remove problematic entries, we have excised all 
observations for a firm in any given year that records negative values for assets or revenues. 
Furthermore, we have dropped all firm-year observations with missing data for any of our 
variables other than dividend payments, interest income, dividend income, share repurchases 
and segment operating profit. All data are taken from Compustat North America, other than 
the segment data which are taken from Compustat Segments. To collect data on financial 
divisions of non-financial firms we have included only data for segments which have a segment 
standard industrial classification (SICS1) code starting with ‘6’, and then matched these 
financial division data with consolidated data taken from Compustat North America. Overall, 
of the 1000 firms included annually in our Compustat 1000 proxy, an average of 87 firms have 
reported data on financial segment operating profits for any given year. This reached a 
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Figure A2. Asset Structures of the Commodity Trading Firms  
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Figure A3. Interest Income of Commodity Trading Firms 
 
Source: Bloomberg Professional (2020) and Compustat (2020) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the average values for 2010-2019. Series data are smoothed 
to 2-year moving averages. Operating profits for Compustat 1000 is defined simply as the sum 
of net income, interest expenses and tax payments. Series codes for Compustat 1000: idit, ni, 
























































Figure A4. Dividend Income of Commodity Trading Firms 
 
Source: Bloomberg Professional (2020) and Compustat (2020) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the average values for 2010-2019. Series data are smoothed 
to 2-year moving averages. Operating profits for Compustat 1000 is defined simply as the sum 
of net income, interest expenses and tax payments. Series codes for Compustat 1000: esub, ni, 
































































 BlackRock Vanguard State Street Average  
 
No. of management resolutions on approving 
dividends and stock buybacks in firms in 











Percentage of these resolutions that 
asset management company 
favoured in vote 
 
93.5 96.9 96.8 95.9 
Percentage of these resolutions 
gaining a simple majority 
 
99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
Percentage of these resolutions 
gaining a simple majority that asset 
management firm opposed  
 
1.3 0.3 1.9 1.2 
 
No. of shareholder resolutions on improving 
environmental and social governance in 
firms in which asset management company 










Percentage of these resolutions that 
asset management company 
favoured in vote 
 
6.4 6.6 18.3 10.7 
Percentage of these resolutions 
gaining a simple majority  
 
5.9 5.6 5.5 5.7 
Percentage of these resolutions 
gaining a simple majority that asset 
management firm opposed 
 
33.3 8.7 0 12.8 
 
Table A2. The Three Major Asset Management Firms’ Voting Behaviour for 
Resolutions held at Commodity Firms in which they hold Equity, 2014-2019 
 
Source: Proxy Insight (2020) 
 
Note: Commodity firms here are defined as those firms identified by Proxy Insight as belonging 
to the following sectors: basic materials, consumer cyclical, consumer defensive and energy. 
Environmental and social governance resolutions are defined as those categorized by Proxy 
Insight as the following resolution types: corporate social responsibility, energy, environmental, 
human rights, social and sustainability. Averages are weighted according to the number of 































































2010-14 1.12 4.2% 0.68 2.3% 2.32 6.3% 
2015-19 1.74 4.1% 0.71 3.7% 3.05 6.1% 
 
 
Table A3. Receivables Securitization Programmes of Commodity Trading Firms 
 
Source: Bloomberg Professional (2020) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
